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Abstract: Despite being one of the major figures in late medieval thought and being the 
subject of numerous studies, certain topics concerning the Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401-
1464) remain in need of further investigation. One of these is an aspect of his theory of 
cognition: his account of sense perception. It is our aim in this study to systematically look at 
his scattered remarks on the topic and make a number of suggestions as to the nature of his 
thought on how we come to know external things. It is not our purpose to offer a 
comprehensive account of his theory of cognition (for this, cf. C. KNY, Kreative, 
asymptotische Assimilation, forthcoming). Our focus in this article is on his account of 
perception and the specific claim that Nicholas develops a model whereby reason operates 
together with the senses in perceptual experience. Despite being tentative our claim is 
grounded on suggestions found in the scholarship on Cusanus; but these suggestions remain 
quite vague and in need of exploration. In this article, we closely examine the textual evidence 
and develop our claim based on this examination. In order to substantiate it, we proceed as 
follows: first, we consider the core theses on perception in several of Nicholas’ works. 
Second, we bring these elements together and propose a reading of how perception is rational 
according to Cusanus. Despite being an academic outsider and employing terminology in a 
way that sometimes obstructs interpretive access, our paper shows that Nicholas is well-
acquainted with the different traditions in the philosophy of perception, especially 
perspectivist optics and medieval Augustinianism. In addition, and as the result of the role he 
attributes to reason in our experience of the world, Cusanus occupies an important place in the 
history of the development of theories of perception.      
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Introduction 
 
Nicholas of Cusa—short: Cusanus—holds a model of sense perception in which human 
beings, being confronted with species,2 perceive by means of their mens acting through a 
corporeal spirit in the sense organs. For perception to come about, he posits two necessary 
conditions. First, an excitatio has to take place: species cause a perceiver to turn her attention 
towards the sensory object emitting these species. Second, once “excited”, sensory and 
rational powers are jointly employed in the subject of experience to perceive the sensory 
object that has caused the excitatio. 
Looking at this brief summary, its proximity to what is currently being discussed as ‘active 
perception’ seems obvious.3 Although this proximity has been pointed out, however, there is 
                                                 
1 christian.kny@helsinki.fi; jose.pereiradasilva@helsinki.fi. The authors would like to acknowledge funding 
from the European Research Council under the grant agreement n. 637747 for the project Rationality in 
Perception: Transformations of Mind and Cognition 1250-1550.  
2 Species in this medieval context mean sensory representations of properties of external objects. On this, see 
K.H. TACHAU, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Leiden 1988, 3-81.  
3 For a tentative general definition, see J.F. SILVA and M. YRJÖNSUURI, “The World as a Stereogram”, in Active 
Perception in the History of Philosophy, J.F. SILVA and Mikko YRJÖNSUURI, Dordrecht 2014, 1-7; for a 
definition applied to the medieval sources, see J.F. SILVA, “Medieval Theories of Active Perception: an 
Overview”, in Active Perception in the History of Philosophy, J.F. SILVA and Mikko YRJÖNSUURI, Dordrecht 
2014, 117-146.  
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remarkably little research on Cusanus’ account of sense perception. The existing research 
stays at surface level in two important regards: On the one hand, there is no detailed analysis 
of the key passages on perception in Cusanus’ works. The interpretive claims which have 
been made thus are correct but of a rather general nature.4 On the other hand, recent 
developments of the scholarly discussions about ‘active perception’ are not taken into 
account. 
By providing a detailed systematic examination of Cusanus’ notion of sense perception, we 
pursue two complementary objectives in this paper: first, we will conduct the textual analysis 
necessary to make well-founded claims about how Cusanus conceives sense perception. 
Second, we will make clear what ‘active perception’ means with regard to Cusanus, in the 
process pointing out key aspects of the philosophical tradition Cusanus relies upon. The thesis 
we will argue for can be put as follows: Cusanus describes human perception as active in 
terms of a rational structuring of inward-bound sensory information that is concurrent and 
intricately connected with the sensory experience itself.  
We will argue for this thesis in two sections. As there is no detailed analysis of Cusanus’ 
account of sense perception yet, such an analysis makes up the first, and most extensive, 
section of this paper. While some of the systematic questions arising from Cusanus’ 
statements about perception are discussed in this first section, the main question is raised in 
the second section: how exactly is rational perception to be understood with Cusanus? We 
conclude with a short summary of our results from these two sections. 
 
 
 
I. Cusanus on Perception: Textual Analysis 
 
Cusanus does not offer a single, unified account of sense perception. He brings the issue up in 
different works and contexts, often in the form of brief remarks. There are, however, a few 
works in which he goes into some detail regarding sense perception, most notably Idiota de 
mente and the Compendium. We will focus on these two in our analysis, complementing the 
examination with a (briefer) look at a few important passages from De coniecturis. 
 
 
(a) Idiota de mente 
                                                 
4 Research on Cusanus’ notion of sense perception can be divided into two groups. One the one hand, there are 
contributions ascribing a model of active perception to Cusanus—cf. C.L. MILLER, “Cusanus, Nicolaus [Nicolas 
of Cusa]”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), ed. E.N. ZALTA 
(https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/cusanus/); C. LEIJENHORST, “Active Perception from 
Nicholas of Cusa to Thomas Hobbes”, in Active Perception in the History of Philosophy, J.F. SILVA and Mikko 
YRJÖNSUURI, Dordrecht 2014, 176; L. SPRUIT, Species intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge. Volume 
Two: Renaissance Controversies, Later Scholasticism, and the Elimination of the Intelligible Species in Modern 
Philosophy (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 49), Leiden 1995. 20-28; J. HOPKINS, Nicholas of Cusa on 
Wisdom and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1996, 27-31 (in a more Aristotelian spirit than other interpreters). On the 
other hand, there is a discussion mostly limited to the German research community about the role of sense 
perception in the wider epistemic framework Cusanus portrays—cf. I. Bocken, “Perspektiven der Theorie. 
Philosophie als scientiae aenigmatica bei Nicolaus Cusanus”, in Spiegel und Porträt. Zur Bedeutung zweier 
zentraler Bilder im Denken des Nicolaus Cusanus. Festgabe für Klaus Reinhardt zum 70. Geburtstag 
(Veröffentlichungen des Cusanus-Studien-Centrums 5), Maastricht 2005, 31-39; K. KREMER, “Erkennen bei 
Nikolaus von Kues. Apriorismus—Assimilation—Abstraktion”, in Praegustatio naturalis sapientiae. Gott 
suchen mit Nikolaus von Kues, ed. K. KREMER (Buchreihe der Cusanus-Gesellschaft. Sonderausgabe), Münster 
2004, 7-14; T. VAN VELTHOVEN, Gottesschau und menschliche Kreativität, Leiden 1977, 107-109. It is not 
entirely surprising that there is no detailed account of sense perception in this second group; their focus is less on 
perception in and of itself, and more on its function regarding the “higher” epistemic activities. It is surprising, 
however, that there is no detailed account of sense perception in the first group; interpretive claims about sense 
perception in and of itself are made, but the textual analysis these claims rest upon is not particularly extensive. 
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Idiota de mente (De mente, hereafter), written in 1450, is a made-up conversation between a 
layman (the key figure the work is named after), a philosopher, and an orator. In it, Cusanus 
discusses the human mens, which under certain aspects he refers to as soul,5 both from 
ontological and epistemological points of view. Among the latter are descriptions of the 
different epistemic functions humans can engage in. After the layman has presented these 
activities, Cusanus lets the philosopher summarise “how the physicians think that sensations 
come about”6. 
According to this summary, perception requires the existence of a sensory object, an 
external medium, a sensory organ, blood, a corporeal spiritus and the soul. These components 
interact with and make use of each other as follows: At the initiative of the perceiver’s soul, 
the corporeal spiritus moves through the blood to reach the sensory organs. There, sensory 
objects are encountered in a medium whose material constitution is proportioned to a given 
sense modality. Fire, (pure or thick) air, water, and earth are the media assigned to the senses, 
hierarchically ordered from vision to touch. Now when a sensory object is encountered, it is 
encountered as an obstacle. The corporeal spiritus is impeded in its motion by this obstacle; 
the soul, using the spiritus as its instrument, is made to notice that something is happening on 
its interface with the external world. Nicholas describes this as an ‘excitatio’: 
 
[DM1] [W]hen being confronted with a certain external object, the spirit is turned back 
and the soul is stimulated (excitatur) to take note of that which stands in the way.7 
 
In order to make sense of the excitatio—described as the mens being woken up8—, the 
perceiver employs her perceptual capacities.9 Explaining, in the voice of the philosopher, 
what happens within a perceiver when perceiving something, Cusanus says: 
 
[DM2] if there is an obstacle, then that spirit (which is the instrument of the senses) is 
impeded and the soul—as if impeded—apprehends confusedly (confuse) through the 
senses the thing that stands in its way. For in and of themselves the senses demarcate 
nothing. That we, when we see something, impose a demarcation on it is not due to the 
sense but to the imagination, which is conjoined (adiuncta) to the sense.10 
 
As the philosopher describes it here, the process of perceptual experience consists of two 
constitutive moments or stages. First, there is being affected by a sensory object—the 
corporeal spirit as the instrument of the soul’s action encounters and is impeded by an 
obstacle that has an inward-bound nature, i.e. that comes from the outside. The important 
thing to keep in mind here is that this affection is described not simply as the action of 
something external on the senses, but as that external thing being present to the senses and 
                                                 
5 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.1 n.57, ed. R. STEIGER, in Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia, iussu et 
auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita (h 2V), Hamburg 1983 for the relation 
between mens and soul in De mente. Cf. p. 8sq. below. 
6 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.8 n.112, ed. R. STEIGER: “Optarem te, philosophe, audire, quomodo 
physici opinentur sensationes fieri”. English translations of the Latin text are based on those by J. Hopkins 
(freely accessible in the section “Übersetzungen” on http://www.cusanus-portal.de) and have been modified for 
clarification purposes when needed. 
7 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.8 n.113, ed. R. STEIGER: “Cum ergo aliquod exterius obstaculum 
invenit, repercutitur spiritus ille, et excitatur anima ad perpendendum illud, quod obstat”. 
8 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.85, ed. R. STEIGER:”in nostris mentis ab initio vita [...] similis est 
dormienti, quousque admiratione, quae ex sensibilibus oritur, excitetur, ut moveatur”. 
9 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.8 n.112sq. , ed. R. STEIGER. 
10 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.8 n.114, ed. R. STEIGER: “Unde fit, ut aliqua re obstante spiritus ille, 
qui sentiendi instrumentum est, tardetur et anima quasi tarda rem illam, quae obstat, confuse per sensus ipsos 
comprehendat. Sensus enim, quantum in se est, nihil terminat. Quod enim, cum aliquid videmus, terminum in 
ipso ponimus, illud quidem imaginationis est, quae adiuncta est sensui, non sensus”. 
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thus preventing or blocking the motion of the corporeal spirit operating under the direction 
and initiative of the soul. The second moment or stage is the act of discrimination. As senses 
themselves grasp their obstacles in an indeterminate, confused way, the indeterminate content 
they provide needs to be ordered for perception to be of some thing. This second task is 
performed by the imaginatio—and, with a higher level of differentiation, by the ratio.11 
To which extent is this core account of sense perception further fleshed out in the De 
mente? As a preliminary point, a limitation of human cognition has to be mentioned here. 
Cusanus characteristically claims throughout his works that any attempt of trying to gain 
knowledge of something not created by humans is a process of assimilation12 that never 
entirely reaches its goal.13 As this thesis applies to all epistemic activities humans can 
perform, it necessarily applies to sense perception as well. Whatever exactly happens in 
perception, therefore, cannot yield full or exhaustive perceptual access to what is perceived. 
With this general limitation in mind, we can move on to the specifics of sense perception. 
First, there is the obstacle affecting the senses and thus impeding the corporeal spiritus. In the 
passages just discussed, sound (or voice; vox) and odour are given as examples for such 
obstacles.14 However, there is no information about how these obstacles are related to the 
entities they are voices or odours of. Two earlier passages provide essential information in this 
regard: 
 
[DM3] [B]y its own nature sight does not discriminate but […], confusedly and in a 
certain undifferentiated totality (in globo quodam et confuse), it senses an intervening 
thing which gets in [sight’s] way within the sphere of its operation, i.e., within the eye. 
This obstacle is produced in the eye from a multiplication of the forms (species) of the 
object.15 
 
[DM4] Our mind, when it is stimulated by the obstacle of the forms (species) which are 
multiplied from the objects to the spirit, assimilates itself to the objects by means of the 
forms.16 
                                                 
11 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.8 n.114sq. , ed. R. STEIGER. Generally, establishing order by means 
of processes like discrimination, definition, etc. is the key feature of the ratio according to Cusanus—“omnis 
discretio ex ratione est” (NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.83, ed. R. STEIGER). In relation to sense 
perception in De mente cf. Cusanus, Idiota de mente c.5 n.82sq.; c.7 n.100; c.8 n.115, ed. R. STEIGER. In some 
passages like the one discussed here, the imaginatio is endowed with a certain—lesser, in contrast with that of 
the ratio—ability to discriminate. One of the questions we are asking in this paper is whether the role of reason 
in perception is limited to this operation of discrimination or whether it brings something further into human 
perceptual experience. 
12 There are different ways of spelling out what ‘assimilation’ means from an epistemological point of view. 
Generally, it can be described as cognising something by becoming (like) this something, where the something 
can be any object of cognition, be it material or immaterial. More specifically, then, the assimilation can be 
conceived as taking place either (a) via mental representations of what is cognised, i.e. via intermediaries 
between cogniser and what is cognised; or (b) by means of the cogniser becoming (like) what is cognised in the 
act of assimilation without any intermediaries. Both strategy (a) and (b) can then be divided into sub-branches. 
While it is a question worth investigating where to place Cusanus in this regard, it is not the question we are 
concerned with here. For our purpose it is sufficient to work with a general notion of assimilation as entailing 
awareness of an external thing without committing to any of the strategies of spelling it out. 
13 For Cusanus’ first philosophical work, cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De docta ignorantia I c.1 n.3sq.; c.3 n.9sq., 
ed. K. BORMANN, in Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia, iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis 
ad codicum fidem edita (h 2I), Hamburg 2008.  For his last work cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De apice theoriae 
n.3sq.; 10sq., ed. R. KLIBANSKY et H.G. SENGER, in Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia, iussu et auctoritate 
Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita (h XII), Hamburg 1982. For De mente, cf. 
NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.2 n.59sq.; c.3 n.69-72, ed. R. STEIGER. 
14 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.8 n.113, ed. R. STEIGER. 
15 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.82, ed. R. STEIGER: “Nosti enim visum de sua propria natura non 
discernere, sed in globo quodam et confuse sentire obstaculum, quod sibi obviat intra sphaeram motus sui, 
scilicet oculum, quod quidem obstaculum generatur ex multiplicatione specierum obiecti in oculum”. 
16 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.7 n.100, ed. R. STEIGER: “[E]xcitata per obstaculum specierum ab 
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Cusanus employs terminology here that is clearly derived from the species-doctrine that was 
popular in the thirteenth century and with few exceptions remained at the core of the 
dominant model of perception until the modern period. [DM3] and [DM4] make clear: the 
obstacles perceivers are confronted with are not sensory objects like trees or dragonflies 
themselves, but the species which are emitted from these objects and which arrive at the 
perceivers’ sense organs by means of multiplication through a medium.17 Cusanus does not 
elaborate on this emission and multiplication of species in De mente, which may be explained 
by the fact that it was common knowledge in his time and thus in no need of particular 
justification. It can also mean that in De mente, Cusanus has nothing substantial to add to the 
debate over the nature of the species and their role in the perceptual process. Instead, he 
seems to take their existence and epistemic role at face value and choose to remain neutral 
about any particular interpretation of these representational devices. Therefore, [DM3] and 
[DM4] make the statements about a confrontation with obstacles significantly less vague than 
the passages appear to be when read in isolation. They achieve this by situating Cusanus in a 
well-established tradition on perception that takes perception, especially visual perception, to 
be dependent on incoming sensory species. His readers would certainly be familiar with such 
a theory, which may explain why he did not feel the need to provide a more detailed 
presentation.    
A second specification can be made: the contact with an obstacle leading to an excitatio 
takes place within perceivers.18 As the general thesis that being confronted with an obstacle 
leads to an excitatio leaves room for holding pretty much any theory of sense perception 
(either active or passive), this qualification is necessary.19 Taking sight as an example: if the 
locus of the confrontation were not determined, both intromissionist and extramissionist 
accounts of visual perception—whereby species are issued from the object to eye, according 
to the intromissionist picture, or visual rays exit the eyes towards the object, according to the 
extramission model—would be possible. The fact that Cusanus incorporates the doctrine of 
the multiplicatio specierum from sensory objects to perceivers, however, strongly indicates an 
intromissionist account. [DM3] confirms this, again with sight as the example: the species 
perform their role as obstacles within the eye, meaning that they impede the progression of the 
corporeal spirit by being received in the sense organ. The same holds, in their respective sense 
organs, for sounds and odours: The corporeal spiritus is confronted with sounds in the ears (in 
auribus), with an odour when it enters the nose (cum nares subintrat).20 In the face of this and 
given [DM3], the following passage—part of the philosophers description of how sensations 
come about—might appear surprising: 
                                                                                                                                                        
obiectis ad spiritum multiplicatarum se assimilat rebus per species”. 
17 The locus classicus of this doctrine is ROGER BACON, De multiplicatione specierum, in Roger Bacon’s 
Philosophy of Nature, ed. and trans. D.C. LINDBERG, Oxford 1983. For the origins of the doctrine, see D.C. 
LINDBERG, Theories of Vision. From Al-Kindi to Kepler. Chicago 1976. For opposing views on the issue and the 
problems related to the species (and further references), see J.F. SILVA and J. TOIVANEN, “The Active Nature of 
the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter John of Olivi”, in Vivarium 48:3-4 (2010), 245-278. 
We do not claim that the connections to the tradition of sense perception we point out in this paper are original 
findings. Generally, the apparatus of the Cusanus’ critical edition provides a good overview of the authors and 
texts Cusanus could be referring back to. What our analysis of Cusanus’ account of perception shows is how he 
places himself in regard of some of the key position in the matter. 
18 At this point we remain neutral as to whether or not the presence of the species is the cause of the excitatio. 
We come back to this later in this section—in which way perceptual experience is active or passive, according to 
Cusanus, partially depends on this qualification. The excitatio is an established topos in connection with sense 
perception. On the excitation-model of perception of Boethian origin, see J.F. SILVA, Robert Kilwardby on the 
Human Soul. Plurality of Forms and Censorship in the Thirteenth-Century. Leiden 2012, 136-37; H.T. 
ADRIAENSSEN, “Peter John Olivi on Perceptual Representation”, Vivarium 49:4 (2011), 324-52. 
19 On this, see J.F. SILVA, “The Chameleonic Mind. The Activity versus the Actuality of Perception” 
(forthcoming). 
20 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.8 n.113, ed. R. STEIGER. 
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[DM5] [T]he very strong, subtle, and acute direction of the rays of the eyes brings it 
about that the air yields to it and that nothing can resist it except something densely 
earthen or densely aqueous.21 
 
Without introducing them before this passage and without mentioning them again afterwards, 
Cusanus suddenly seems to bring in notions of an extramissionist account of vision here. 
Looking at [DM3], the question arises: If objects emit species that arrive in the eye and lead 
to an excitatio there, why and how would one want to fit visual rays into the picture? There is 
no need to establish contact with sensory objects outside the boundary of the eyes when 
perceivers are confronted with species in the eyes, so there is no need to reach out to anything 
by means of visual rays. 
In fact, [DM5] is helpful in informing us of what version of the species-doctrine could be 
serving as a background for Cusanus. For we find the same dual account—incoming species 
and outgoing visual rays—in Roger Bacon. According to Bacon, in his treatise Perspectiva, 
the eyes receive species issued from every point on the surface of an object in a complicated 
process of diffusion. However, a fiery spirit has to be issued through the eyes of a perceiver to 
prepare the medium (air or water) surrounding the surface of the eyes for taking on the visual 
species.22 Once the medium is thus disposed, the species can be received in the already 
disposed eye lens of the perceiver. Whether there is a need for these rays, in addition to the 
incoming species, was controversial, as the traditional account of the species is built on an 
intromission assumption and in opposition to the extramission model. Alhacen, one of the 
most important proponents of the so-called perspectivist optics on whom Bacon himself 
relies, devotes a lengthy section of his work De aspectibus to criticize the extramission 
model.23 It is not our aim to examine the reasons why Bacon includes the extramission of 
visual rays in his account of visual perception; important is that this inclusion could be taken 
to provide an explanation of why Cusanus does not seem to have any problem with 
incorporating visual rays himself. He could simply be taking Bacon for granted as a 
background. What Cusanus describes can, as the sudden appearance of visual rays 
exemplifies, seem vague and conceptually strange at times. Nevertheless, it can be shown to 
share a great deal with the discussions on perception he is looking back on. 
Third, Cusanus’ account of perception in De mente raises questions regarding what is 
perceived. If the species received in the sensory organs are what impedes the corporeal 
spiritus and what the soul engaging with through the spiritus, what exactly is the object of 
perception—the species functioning as obstacles or the sensory objects emitting the species? 
The answer to this question determines whether Cusanus adheres to a more representationalist 
or a more (indirect) realist notion of perception. This answer cannot be given unambiguously, 
though, as the passages discussed so far show. [DM1], [DM2], and [DM3] seem to suggest 
that it is the obstacle that is sensed, which would make the species the (primary) object of 
perception. [DM4], in contrast, clearly describes the species as a medium quo; it is through 
the species that assimilation to objects takes place. The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that Cusanus often, and consciously, avoids terminological precision.24 Context plays a 
crucial role in understanding what he means when employing a given term, but the context of 
                                                 
21 NICOLAUS CUSANUS,  Idiota de mente c.8 n.113, ed. R. STEIGER: “Facit etiam oculorum adeo fortis radiorum 
directio subtilis et acuta, ut aër ei cedat nec aliquid ei obsistere possit, nisi grossum sit terreum vel aqueum”. 
22 ROGER BACON, Perspectiva I d.7, c.2-4, ed. D.C. LINDBERG. 
23 ALHACEN, De aspectibus I.6.55-56, in Alhacen’s Theory of Visual Perception, ed. and transl. A.M. SMITH, 
Philadelphia 2001.  
24 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.8 n.111, ed. R. STEIGER: “Ego, qui sum idiota, non multum ad verba 
attendo”. This stance is due to the conviction that language cannot reach precision when trying to capture 
anything that is not brought into existence solely by humans. Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.2 
n.58—c.3 n.70, ed. R. STEIGER for the key sections in this regard. 
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the passages in question here does not yield much information regarding the (primary) object 
of perception. It is plausible to assume that Cusanus considers the species as media quo—
similar to how he seems to take visual rays for granted, he could take Thomas’ description of 
the species as an id quo25 for granted. Cusanus shows no awareness concerning the question 
of what the primary object of perception is that would indicate a different take on species. 
What he writes does not rule out either of the interpretive options.  
The fact that Cusanus appeals to a two-stage framework of perception that consists of 
excitatio and discrimination raises, fourth, a key question regarding the sequence of the 
processes involved: can there be an excitatio that does not already entail the mind being in a 
perceptive state? In other words, can perceptual capacities be said to engage with an obstacle 
of the corporeal spirit after an excitatio, without the obstacle being perceived right away when 
it is encountered (i.e. when the mind is made to notice such an obstacle to the motion of the 
spirit it directs)? To have a clear view of how Cusanus conceives of perception, it is essential 
to clarify how the excitatio is to be understood—if the excitatio already entails perception, 
then the senses’ indeterminate perception appears to be part of the first stage, whereas the 
ordering of indeterminate content marks the second stage. If, on the other hand, the excitatio 
entails no perception, then both the senses’ indeterminate perception and the discriminating 
activity of the imaginatio or ratio have to take place in the second stage. The passages 
discussed so far are not clear in this regard. [DM3] and [DM4] are neutral. [DM1] can be read 
as suggesting that the excitatio is a non-cognitive process, as the soul only takes note (and, 
with that, action) in reaction to being impeded by an obstacle. [D2], on the other hand, does 
not seem to suggest a succession of a non-perceptual excitatio and  perceptual activity. 
The following passage provides a clear indication of how to approach this question: 
 
[DM6] in our body, the mind makes various fine and coarse (subtiles et grossas) 
configurations in accordance with the varying pliability of the arterial spirits present in 
the organs, and one spirit is not configurable to that to which another is. Because the 
spirit in the optic nerve cannot be affected by forms of sound but only by forms of 
colours, it is configurable to the forms of colours but not of sounds. And the same holds 
for the others [sc. spirits]. And there is another spirit that is configurable—though in a 
coarse and indiscriminate (grosso et indiscrete) manner—to all perceptual forms; it is 
imaginative organ. And there is another in the rational ogan, which is configurable 
discretely and clearly to all perceptible things.26 
 
The passage is part of the description Cusanus provides of the forms of assimilation human 
mentes can perform. This description is central to De mente, and its underlying thesis is that 
the mens assimilates itself ([DM4]) to its objects of cognition,27 therefore characterising 
cognition as an active process. Important regarding the excitatio in [DM6] is that indistinct 
sensing (the coarse assimilation of the arterial spirits and the coarse assimilation of the 
imaginatio) is already described as an assimilative activity of the mens.28 Cusanus thus puts 
indeterminate sensing and rational discrimination on the same side of the epistemic equation. 
If rational discrimination only becomes active due to an excitatio, the same must hold for 
                                                 
25 Cf. THOMAS DE AQUINO, Summa Theologiae I q.85 a.2, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu 
Leonis XIII edita, Ia q. 50-119 cum commentariis Caietani, Rome 1889. 
26 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.7 n.101sq. , ed. R. STEIGER: “in nostro corpore mens facit secundum 
variam flexibilitatem spirituum arteriarum in organis varias configurationes subtiles et grossas, et unus spiritus 
non est configurabilis ad id, ad quod alius. Quia spiritus in nervo optico non est offendibilis per species sonorum, 
sed solum colorum, ideo configurabilis est speciebus colorum et non sonorum. Et ita de aliis. Et est alius spiritus 
ad omnes sensibiles species configurabilis, qui est in organo imaginativae, sed grosso et indiscrete modo. Et alius 
in organo ractiocinativae est ad omnia sensibilia discrete et lucide configurabilis”. 
27 For the full section on the forms of assimilation cf. Cusanus, Idiota de mente c.7 n.99-106, ed. R. STEIGER. 
28 The terminology of ‘coarse’ and ‘discriminate’ assimilation is closely related to that of the ‘confused’ and 
indiscriminate sensing Cusanus describes in [DM2] and [DM3]. 
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indiscriminate sensing. An excitatio therefore seems to precede perception. Both sensing and 
rationalising take place only when an excitatio makes the mens take note of the obstacle 
causing it. This allows us to stop being neutral regarding to the causal impact of the species.29 
As both the sensory and rational powers of the mens become active only after an excitatio, the 
presence of the species in the sensory organs of a perceiver have to cause the excitatio. 
This does not mean that an excitatio is “empty” in the sense that the species causing it 
carry no information—such a claim would invalidate the whole notion of species as 
representatives of the objects emitting them. Rather, it means that the information species 
carry does not automatically cause perceptual content the moment it is received in a sensory 
organ. To access this information and generate perceptual content, the mens has to do 
something, both sensorily and rationally, but it only does it when incoming species hitting the 
appropriate sensory organs cause an excitatio. In our current terminology, we could put it like 
this: species carry encoded information. If a species arrives in an appropriate sensory organ, a 
connection is established between itself and the corporeal spirit in this sensory organ. But this 
reception is not on its own conducive of cognition, i.e. the information is not automatically 
decoded. Rather, in a first step, the reception of the information triggers the sending of a 
signal that catches the attention of the mens animating the corporeal spirit. The mens then, in a 
second step, employs the sensory and rational instruments necessary to decode the 
information, generating an episode of perception with content that is properly structured. 
The relation between excitatio and perception being thus accounted for, a fifth and final 
aspect remains to be fleshed out. The fact that Cusanus speaks of different mental powers 
employed in sense perception—indiscriminate sensing and rational distinction or 
discrimination (discretio)30—raises the question of how they interact. After having established 
that both the senses and the ratio operate after an excitatio, now the relation between the 
senses and the ratio when becoming active due to an excitatio has to be clarified. 
Up until now, our emphasis has been on the description of the receiving-triggering process, 
paying little attention to the capacities at play in that process. It is therefore necessary at this 
point to provide some clarification on how Cusanus characterises ‘mind’ (mens) and ‘power’ 
(vis) in De mente. ‘Mens’ according to De mente, comes in two varieties: infinite or as an 
image of the infinite. The former is the divine mens, god. Images of the divine mens can, as 
they are themselves not infinite, animate bodies. If they do so, they are called ‘soul’. Thus, 
according to this model from the first chapter of De mente, minds are more basic than souls in 
the sense that they can be (in the strong sense) in and of themselves (in se subsistens), while 
                                                 
29 Cf. footnote 18 above. 
30 A possible influence for this conception is Hugh of St. Victor. On his use of the notion of ‘discretio’ in a 
similar way cf. J.P. KLEINZ, The Theory of Knowledge of Hugh of St. Victor, Ann Arbor, Michigan 1987, 55. In 
Avicenna’s De anima, the traditional place for the classification of the internal senses, the function of 
discrimination belongs to the common sense (see AVICENNA, Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus I.5; II.2; 
III.8; IV.1-5, ed. S. VAN RIET, Louvain-Leiden 1972). On this, see C. DI MARTINO, Ratio Particularis. Doctrine 
des sens internes d’Avicenne à Thomas d’Aquin, Paris 2008. In Alhacen, and then in the tradition of perspectivist 
optics, discrimination is assigned to a virtus distinctiva (ALHACEN, De aspectibus II.3.17, ed. A.M. SMITH). 
There is a dispute within this tradition regarding the rational or sensory nature of discrimination, as well as 
whether discrimination constitutes—ontologically speaking—a cognitive faculty on its own or is rather a 
function of a cognitive faculty. Without going into the details of the debate it suffices to say that Nicholas sides 
with authors such as Alhacen, John Pecham, and perhaps more importantly, Blasius of Parma, in contrast with 
e.g. Roger Bacon. On this, see J. HACKETT, “Animal and Human Knowledge in the Perspectiva: (Opus Maius, 
part five) of Roger Bacon”, in Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristotelianism of the 
13th Century, ed. L.X. LÓPEZ-FARJEAT and J.A. TELLKAMP, Paris 2013, 223-241; A.I. SABRA, “Sensation and 
Inference in Alhacen’s Theory of Visual Perception”, in Studies in Perception. Interrelations in the History of 
Philosophy and Science, ed. P.K. MACHAMER and R.G. TURNBULL, Columbus, Ohio 1978, 160-185; J.F. SILVA, 
“Perceptual Judgment in Late Medieval Perspectivist Psychology”, Filosoficky Casopis, in Special Issue on 
Perception in Scholastics and Their Interlocutors 2 (2017), 29-60; A.M. SMITH, From Sight to Light. The 
Passage from Ancient to Modern Optics, Chicago 2015.  
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they are souls only when animating a body (in corpore subsistens).31 Human souls are 
therefore embodied mentes.32 As such, they perform, as one living substance encompassing 
them all, a variety of (hierarchically ordered) functions: vegetative, sensitive, rational, 
intellectual, intellectible.33 But if it is one and the same mens as an ontological unity that is 
performing all these functions, it has to be able to perform different functions—and especially 
functions of a different kind, say sensory and intellective—at the same time. If we could not 
breathe and think at the same time, for example, life as a philosopher would be much more 
dangerous than generally given credit for. While Cusanus does not explicitly make this 
important point himself, he makes another, quite similar, one: the different functions a 
humans mind can perform are not strictly separated from each other. The mens can 
(intellectually) “inform and illuminate and perfect” its rational activities, and the same holds 
for the rational activities with regard to the senses.34 Interpreting this as different functions 
being performed separately and related to each other only after their respective tasks are 
finished is possible, but the way Cusanus phrases the interaction between the different 
functions strongly suggests that they are not independent of each other in the sense just 
described. While, given the way Cusanus describes them as different, it is implausible to 
assume that he is making a strong claim of identity according to which the different functions 
are in fact identical,35 the functions appear to be either concurrent with or permeating each 
other. This is particularly the case with the role reason plays in the perceptual process. 
Similar suggestions have been made in the literature but we find the existing accounts 
lacking in explanatory power: scholars, such as Spruit and Leijenhorst, have approached this 
issue from the point of view of perceptual judgement, but both have said little about what the 
content of the judgement is, as well as the nature of the powers performing it.36 Miller, on the 
other hand, has paired this rational aspect with a passive account of perception.37 We aim at 
complementing their suggestions, by claiming that Cusanus does not understand sense 
perception as a process in which indistinct sensing and (rational) discrimination are two 
operations taking place separately from each other, with the senses first providing some sort 
of content upon which order or structure is at a later stage of processing imposed by reason. 
To the contrary, Cusanus seems to think of the sensory engagement with species and the 
                                                 
31 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.1 n.57, ed. R. STEIGER. 
32 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.81, ed. R. STEIGER: “Visne mentem […] ante corpus fuisse 
[…]? Natura, non tempore. Nam, ut audisti, eam visui in tenebris comparavi. Visus autem nequaquam actu fuit 
ante oculum nisi natura tantum”. 
33 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.80, ed. R. STEIGER. In De mente, Cusanus uses ‘intellectible’ 
(intellectibilis) to describe the epistemic mode in which humans try to assimilate themselves to god. As such, it 
is hierarchically located above intellectual cognition which deals with pure forms. Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, 
Idiota de mente c.7 n.103-106, ed. R. STEIGER in conjunction with the list of epistemic activities in the passage 
quoted at the beginning of the footnote. 
34 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.84, ed. R. STEIGER: “mens informat, dilucidat et perficit 
ratiocinationem, ut sciat quid syllogizet”. The example Cusanus uses to present this assumption is reading. 
Without the ratio informing the senses, one would not even know what is being seen; without the intellect 
informing the ratio, one would only be seeing and ordering letters without knowing what the words formed by 
these letters mean. 
35 Blasius of Parma (c. 1365-1416) makes such a strong claim; cf. BLASIUS DE PELACANIS DE PARMA, 
Quaestiones de anima I q.8, in Le Quaestiones de anima di Biagio Pelacani da Parma, ed. G. FEDERICI 
VESCOVINI and J. BIARD, Florence 1974, 84: “Unde non est dubium quod anima intellectiva est anima visiva et 
auditiva et nutritiva et sic de aliis”. Blasius, whose work Nicholas may have been acquainted with during his stay 
in Padua, defends a materialist conception of the human soul in which no substantial distinctions are found 
within it: the soul that perceives is the soul that understands. On this cf. J.F. SILVA, “Perceptual Judgment in Late 
Medieval Perspectivist Psychology”. Cf. also O. RIGNANI, “Biagio Pelacani e il senso agente”, in Corpo e 
anima, sensi interni e intelletto dai secoli XIII-XIV ai Post-Cartesiani e Spinoziani, ed. G. FEDERICI VESCOVINI 
et al. Turnhout 2005, 247-66. 
36 Cf. C. LEIJENHORST, “Active Perception from Nicholas of Cusa to Thomas Hobbes”, 176; L. SPRUIT, Species 
intelligibilis, 20-28. 
37 C.L. MILLER, “Cusanus, Nicolaus [Nicolas of Cusa]”. 
10 
rational discrimination of the information thus provided as intricately connected aspects of 
one process. As he puts it in [DM2]: when—i.e. at the same time and not after—seeing 
something, the same mind that by using the senses does the seeing rationally discriminates 
that content because the differentiating or discriminating power is conjoined with the sensory 
power. [DM3], in a similar fashion, continues as follows: 
 
[DM6] Hence, if in an eye vision is present without discrimination […], then mind comes 
to the sensible soul just as discrimination comes to (advenit) sight, by which it discerns 
between colours38. 
 
It must be said that the way Cusanus phrases these passages does not categorically rule out a 
reading that conceives the different aspects of sense perception as separate processes of, first, 
sensing and, afterwards, discerning. However, such a reading has a significant amount of 
interpretive work to do. To even discern colours, according to Cusanus, a differentiating 
power has to “come to” sight. He nowhere states that after an act of indiscriminate “sensing” 
what is sensed is differentiated. Given the way he distributes the two tasks carried out in sense 
perception, the only route of a “separatist” reading to account for the fact that we plainly 
sense “somethings” and not just indistinct lumps yet to be ordered would be: to say that the 
indistinct sensing happens so quickly that we do not even notice it and that what we 
experience as perception is actually the discerning process that follows. Along the reading we 
are proposing, on the contrary, one can simply say: as the mens rationally concurs with or 
permeates acts of sensing, distinction of what is perceived takes place right when it is 
perceived. A major consequence of this reading is that, insofar as the act of the reason in 
perception is discrimination (i.e. judgement) and in general terms conceiving understood as 
bringing conceptual unification to reign on the multiplicity of sensory information, human 
perception is inherently rational. 
To conclude the section on De mente, we briefly summarise our results: in De mente, 
Cusanus presents a two-stage model of rational perception. Species in medio, emitted by 
sensory objects, cause an excitatio when they arrive in appropriate sensory organs. This first 
stage leads to the second stage, that of perception proper. Made to take notice of the obstacle 
incoming species present, a human mens employs her sensory and rational powers to engage 
with and make sense of the obstacle encountered. The senses provide indeterminate content, 
and the ratio provides discrimination. Contributing to a joint activity through these powers 
perceptual content is generated based on the information incoming species carry. Perception is 
awareness of whatever is made accessible in that perceptual content, which is sensory 
information rationally structured. However, while the general notion of sense perception 
Cusanus presents seems clear, caution is required because some questions remain concerning 
some of the specifics—i.e. the primary object of perception, the exact way the different 
powers work together, and the discrimination contributed by the ratio. 
 
 
(b) De coniecturis 
 
With these preliminary results and open questions in mind, it makes sense to take a look back 
at De coniecturis, written in 1441/1442. This will help clarifying some of the issues discussed 
so far as well as the suggested solutions. In De coniecturis, Cusanus describes human 
cognition as a conjectural activity that participates in truth to various extents, but can never 
fully reach it.39 This activity takes place in a hierarchically ordered ontological world resting 
                                                 
38 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.82, ed. R. STEIGER: “Unde si adest visio in oculo sine discretione 
[…], tunc ita advenit mens animae sensibili sicut discretio visui, per quam discernit inter colores”. 
39 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis I c.11 n.55, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER, in Nicolai de 
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on god as its absolute origin, and it is performed on different, hierarchically ordered epistemic 
levels.40 While the terminology is different from that in De mente and some of the features 
Cusanus describes in De coniecturis are exclusive to the treatise, the epistemological and 
ontological core assumptions are mostly the same. 
The same can be said, more specifically, for the passages on sense perception. While 
Cusanus offers little on the physiognomy of perception—spiritus (without explicit reference 
to corporeality) is mentioned,41 an “opposing” (obviatio, terminologically close to the 
‘obstare’ from De mente) is stated to be the origin of perception,42 and there is a statement 
about the sleeping ratio being woken up by admiration stemming from perception.43 There is, 
however, a remarkable passage on the epistemic capacities involved in perception and the 
functions they perform: 
 
[DC1] The senses of the soul perceive that which is perceptible and there would not be 
anything perceptible without the unity of the senses. But this perception is confused and 
coarse (confusa atque grossa), removed from all discrimination. For the senses perceive 
but does not discriminate. For every discrimination is from reason, for reason is the unity 
of perceptible number. Therefore, if by means of the senses white is distinguished from 
black, heat from cold, the sharp from the dull, and this perceptible object from that 
perceptible object: this [distinguishing] descends from the property of reason. Therefore, 
the senses as such do not negate; for negating is a feature of discriminating. The senses 
only affirm the existence of the perceptible but do not affirm that the perceptible is this or 
that. Therefore, reason uses the senses as an instrument for discriminating between 
perceptible objects; but it is reason itself which discriminates a perceptible object in the 
senses.44 (emphasis added) 
 
Postponing the explanation of the “unity of the senses” and the reason’s descent for a 
moment, the parallels between [DC1] and De mente are striking. The senses, in isolation, 
could only provide (indeterminate) content in the form of affirming that something 
perceptible is there to be perceived.45 Any discrimination that is taking place in perception is 
only taking place because the soul, more precisely, the rational power of the soul, uses the 
senses as an instrument. Without rational activity, the senses could not even distinguish this 
object from that object. 
Given these parallels, looking at the aspects from [DC1] not discussed in De mente 
promises additional insight. This leads us back to what is in need of explanation: the “unity of 
the senses” and the descent of reason into the senses. First, the ontological and 
epistemological framework Cusanus develops in De coniecturis is one of unities: 
ontologically, god is the absolute unity. In hierarchical order, then, the intelligences, the souls 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cusa Opera Omnia, iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita (h III), 
Hamburg 1972 contains one of the clearest and most explicit descriptions of the notion of asymptotic 
assimilation in Cusanus’ works.  
40 The first book of De coniecturis (NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis prol.-c.13 n.1-69, ed. J. KOCH, K. 
BORMANN et H.G. SENGER) provides a compact description of the treatise’s aims and core aspects. 
41 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis II c.10 n.121, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER. 
42 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis II c.14 n.141, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER. 
43 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis II c.16 n.159, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER. Compare 
the passage in De mente referred to in footnote 8. 
44 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis I c.8 n.32, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER: ”Sensus animae 
sentit sensibile, et non est sensibile unitate sensus non exsistente; sed haec sensatio est confusa atque grossa, ab 
omni semota discretione. Sensus enim sentit et non discernit. Omnis enim discretio a ratione est; nam ratio est 
unitas numeri sensibilis. Si igitur per sensum discernitur album a nigro, calidum a frigido, acutum ab obtuso, hoc 
sensibile ab illo, ex rationali hoc proprietate descendit. Quapropter sensus ut sic non negat, negare enim 
discretionis est; tantum enim affirmat sensibile esse, sed non hoc aut illud. Ratio ergo sensu ut instrumento ad 
discernendum sensibilia utitur; sed ipsa est, quae in sensu sensibilie discernit”. 
45 This includes terminology: ‘grossa’ and ‘confusa’ are the same expressions we find in De mente. 
12 
and the bodies follow as lesser unities.46 Their lesser degree of unity is complemented by an 
increasing degree of alterity regarding the higher unities and god, making it so that on every 
ontological level, every entity is a specific composition of unity and alterity.47 This scheme is 
mirrored epistemologically. The epistemic capacities a human mens has—intellect, reason, 
and the senses, most notably—are considered as unities exhibiting the same pattern.48 Second, 
the unities Cusanus describes in De coniecturis are not just unities in themselves. They are 
connected by the fact that lower unities originate from their respective higher unities, 
diversifying into alterity what is unified one level higher and participating in the unity they 
emerge from in alterity. The intellect, to give an example, is therefore the unity of the soul.49 
Third, Cusanus characterises the relation between the different levels of unities as a 
complementary and simultaneous process of descending and ascending.50  
Cusanus describes the process of descent and ascent with regard to humans as well, and 
this brings us back to sense perception (in which “the soul is the unity of perceptible 
objects”51): 
 
[DC2] Now, this intellect descends in our soul unto the senses so that the perceptible 
ascends unto the intellect; and the perceptible ascends unto the intellect so that the 
intellect descends unto it. For the intellect’s descending unto the perceptual is the 
perceptible’s ascending unto the intellect. For the visible is not attained by the sense of 
sight in the absence of the intellectual power’s endeavor. Indeed, we experience this 
when, being intent on other matters, we do not discern a passerby. For the senses take in, 
confusedly, the perceptible as it ascends unto them; but that perception is unformed and 
indistinct unless, in us, intellect descends through the medium of reason.52 (emphasis 
added) 
 
This alludes (1) to an interesting point not present in De mente. The statement is not entirely 
clear, but when talking about not discerning a passerby Cusanus seems to imply that it is 
possible to simply not notice that passerby or, more generally, sensory objects. As Cusanus 
does not elaborate on the statement, caution is reasonable regarding the conclusions that can 
be drawn from it. But if it is possible to not notice, i.e. perceive, a sensory object, this would 
mean that humans can—given they are “intent on other matters” without closing their eyes or 
using earplugs—receive species without an excitatio being caused and perception ensuing.53 
                                                 
46  Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis I c.12sq. n.61-69, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER. The 
model is more complex than described here, as each unity is further divided in sub-unities. For our purpose, 
however, the rough sketch suffices. 
47 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis I c.9 n.43, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER for the 
introduction of the thought. 
48 Cf. for example the chapter on humans in NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis II c.14 n.140-145, ed. J. KOCH, 
K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER. 
49 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis I c.9 n.39sq. , ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER for the 
assumption and an example of it. 
50 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis I c.4 n.16, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER for the 
introduction of this process. Ibid. II c. 7 n. 107 emphasises the simultaneity of descent and ascent. 
51 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis I c.7 n.28, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER: “Nam cum 
[anima] sit unitas sensibilium, omne diversum sensibiliter in ipsa est unum”. 
52 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis II c.16 n.157, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER: “Intellectus 
autem iste in nostra anima eapropter in sensum descendit, ut sensibile ascendat ad ipsum. Ascendit ad 
intellectum sensibile, ut intelligentia ad ipsum descendat. Hoc est enim intellectum descendere ad sensibile, quod 
sensibile ascendere ad intellectum. Visibile enim non attingitur per sensum visus absente intensione intellectualis 
vigoris. Hoc quidem experimur, dum circa alia intenti praetereuntes non discernimus. Sensus enim confuse capit 
sensibile in ipsum ascendens, sed non est sensatio formata atque discreta absque intellectu in nobis per medium 
ratione descendente”. 
53 We find a similar example in Augustine’s De trinitate (AUGUSTINUS, De Trinitate XI.8.15, ed. W.J. 
MOUNTAIN auxiliante F. GLORIE (CCSL 50), in Aurelii Augustini Opera. Pars XVI,1, Turnhout 1968, 351-52). 
For an interpretation of this passage, see J.F. SILVA, “Augustine on Active Perception”, in Active Perception in 
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[DC2] is (2) relevant regarding the interaction of the mens’ sensory and rational powers 
discussed already in the context of De mente.54 The ratio, the senses(, and the intellect) are 
presented as different unities in [DC2], which again raises the question how strong of a unity 
Cusanus is envisioning the mens to be. If the descending of the intellect and the ascending of 
the senses is one complementary process, does that mean that the senses and the intellect are 
in fact the same? There is a passage in De coniecturis that at first sight seems to point in this 
direction.55 But a closer look reveals that such an interpretation does not withstand scrutiny. 
Cusanus does hold that the mens—or whichever other term is used to describe the 
encompassing unity of certain powers or functions—is a unity that is wholly in its powers or 
functions.56 Therefore, the mens can be said to be intellect, for example, as in turn the 
intellect—pars pro toto—can be called ‘mens’. Nonetheless, the powers of the mens remain 
distinct from each other. Coming back to our starting point of descent and ascent: the notion 
of a hierarchy of epistemic powers or functions would be meaningless if they were considered 
identical. There would simply be nothing to descend or ascend to. [DC2] is one of the 
passages making clear that the powers of the mens are not employed independently of each 
other or in temporal succession. They are not a unity in the sense that they are identical with 
each other. Yet they are intricately connected and work together to generate acts of sense 
perception, each power making its specific contribution. The ratio—or, adding a layer of 
complexity, the intellect through the ratio—descends unto the senses and orders 
indeterminate content into separate objects, qualities, etc. 
How Cusanus (3) describes the joint work yielding sense perception in [DC2] and De 
coniecturis in general provides insight into what it means for the ratio to bring order and 
distinction into perception. It may appear like the senses are contributing something unified 
(an indeterminate mass) to perception which is then split and ordered into a multitude of 
different things by the ratio. Yet the opposite is the case for Cusanus. The discrimination 
contributed to perception by the ratio is actually a unification: by ordering indeterminate 
sensory content the ratio, as it is more unified than the senses, unifies the content they 
provide. A scattered multitude of sensory aspects—colours, smells, tastes, and so on—
“ascends” to the unity of, say, a particular apple tree by means of the ratio “descending” unto 
the senses.57 Rational discrimination in sense perception means finding unity in the alterity of 
indiscriminate sensory content, as the following passage makes clear: 
 
[DC3] Reason is the unity of perceptible nature [...]. Through the unity of reason a 
perceptible multitude of individuals is determined specifically [...]. Therefore, the unity of 
reason enfolds within itself the multitude of all perceptible things.58 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the History of Philosophy, ed. J.F. SILVA and Mikko YRJÖNSUURI, Dordrecht 2014, 79-98. 
54 Cf. p. 8-10 above. 
55 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis II c.16 n.157sq., ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER. Cf. also 
NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.11 n.141, ed. R. STEIGER, where the same point is made. 
56 With this thesis he inscribes himself into the Augustinian tradition on the matter. Compare the passages quoted 
in the previous footnote with passages from pseudo-Augustine’s influential treatise on the spirit and soul, for 
example: PSEUDO-AUGUSTINUS, De spiritu et anima, ed. J.P. MIGNE (PL 779-832), 788-89, 794. 
57 Similarly, this particular apple tree would “ascend” to the intellectual unity of what it is to be an apple tree by 
means of the intellect descending unto the rational multitude of apple trees. 
58 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis II c.12 n.133, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER: “Unitas 
naturae [...] sensibilis ratio est, per rationis unitatem specificatur sensibilis individuorum multitudo [...]. Unitas 
igitur rationis in se complicat sensibilium omnium naturalium et artificialium multitudinem [...]”. “Enfolding” 
(complicare) and “unfolding” (explicare) is terminology commonly used by Cusanus to express the relation 
described here in terms of unity and alterity. Extensively on the notion of complicatio and explicatio cf. A. 
MORITZ, Explizite Komplikationen. Der radikale Holismus des Nikolaus von Kues (Buchreihe der Cusanus-
Gesellschaft 14), Münster 2006. For short summaries cf. K. REINHARDT, “Complicatio - explicatio”, in 
Manuductiones. Festschrift zu Ehren von Jorge M. Marchetta und Claudia D'Amico, ed. C. RUSCONI, Münster 
2014, 81-91; T. LEINKAUF, Nicolaus Cusanus (Buchreihe der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 15), Münster 2006, 102-110. 
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According to Cusanus, this structuring by reason is what makes the sensory information 
intelligible. One could object that, hidden under the terminology of unity and alterity, of 
descent and ascent, Cusanus is simply giving a traditional account of abstraction. Imposing 
order by unifying alterity would, then, simply mean that reason finds patterns or, to be more 
precise, commonness in the likenesses of objects it receives through the senses. Statements 
like “The intellect’s descending unto perceptual images is the perceptual images’ ascending 
from the conditions of their contractedness onto less contracted simplicities”59 could be read 
in this sense. Arguing for an objection along these lines, however, is only possible when 
ignoring the complementary and simultaneous nature attributed to the processes of descensus 
and ascensus by Cusanus. This would not do justice to De coniecturis. Nothing speaks against 
incorporating notions of abstraction in the ascensus Cusanus describes; starting from spatio-
temporal entities, epistemic ascent can be put in terms of investigating these objects from an 
increasingly abstract point of view. Yet Cusanus certainly does not give  a “traditional”, 
strictly Aristotelian account of abstraction.60 He is not simply describing the process of 
grouping similar properties under concepts but also applying concepts to the things perceived. 
This model fits better into his description of descent and ascent as a “two-directional 
progression”. As such, his is a major contribution to medieval theories of perception.   
De coniecturis, to summarise, both confirms the conclusion we arrived at regarding De 
mente and provides insight into what Cusanus means when he is talking about rational 
discrimination in perception. There are notable differences between De mente and De 
coniecturis, but the statements on sense perception in both works are compatible. De 
coniecturis is far less clear about the physiognomy of perception, but it provides information 
about how perception is rational that both confirms and enriches what can be found in De 
mente in this regard.61 What we want to know, as cognitive beings, is the extent to which 
unity can be found in things. Discrimination is aimed at identifying to which degree what is 
perceptible “partakes, with a degree of alterity, of the unity”62. But this discrimination and the 
evaluation of unity and alterity cannot be carried out by the senses alone. It can only be 
carried out by the senses together with with reason. Only by means of this joint action can we 
perceive what there is from an inherently perspectival, conjectural way: one perceives a face 
not as it is in itself, but according to the angles of one’s eyes. By means of reason operating 
jointly with the senses, we cannot fail to be aware of this perspectival way and the lack of 
precision it results in. “The senses experience their own alterity”63, in Cusanus’ words. All 
                                                 
59 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis II c.16 n.161, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER: “Nam 
intellectum in species sensibiles descendere est ascendere eas de conditionibus contrahentibus ad absolutiores 
simplicitates”. 
60 He does this neither in De coniecturis nor in any of his other works. Passages indicating an Aristotelian model 
of continuous abstraction from the senses to the intellect appear throughout his works, but they are not made 
compatible with the autonomy of the intellect Cusanus postulates at the same time. Cf. C. KNY, Kreative, 
asymptotische Assimilation (BGPhThMA. N.F.), Münster (forthcoming), 286-299 for a detailed analysis of the 
issue. 
61 The extensive usage of complicatio and explicatio (cf. for example NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.3 
n.70-72; c.9 n.116-125, ed. R. STEIGER) as well as a statement like the “mind draw[ing] unto itself that which it 
frees from variability” (NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.15 n.156, ed. R. STEIGER: “Ad se enim attrahit, 
quod a variabilitate abstrahit”) show that the notion of (rationality in perception as a) unification is still present 
in De mente. 
62 Cusanus uses a sensible and rational circle as the example to illustrate this in NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De 
coniecturis I c.11 n.54, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER: “Sensibilis igitur circulus in alteritate unitate 
rationalis circuli participat”. 
63 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, De coniecturis I c.11 n.57, ed. J. KOCH, K. BORMANN et H.G. SENGER: “sensus in 
unitate rationis suam alteritatem experitur”. The ratio and the intellect experience the same, as the full sentence 
shows: “Quemadmodum vero sensus in unitate rationis suam alteritatem experitur et assertiones sensibiles ab 
unitate praecisionis absolvendo coniecturis facit, ita ratio in radicali unitate sua, in ipso scilicet intelligentiae 
lumine, suam alteritatem et casum a praecisione in coniecturam invenit, sic et intelligentia ipsa, ut propinqua 
potentia, in unitate divina se suo clarissimo modo gaudet coniectari”. 
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human knowledge is a conjecture, but an informed conjecture. When it comes to perception, 
this is made possible by reason flowing unto the senses in operation, structuring the sensory 
content received. 
 
 
(c) Compendium 
 
After this brief look back at De coniecturis from De mente, we now move on to the 
Compendium. Written in 1464, shortly before Nicholas’ death, it spells out human cognition 
in terms of species—with connections to, but not as a manifestation of species-theories of 
cognition as, e.g., Aquinas holds one. Core aspects of sense perception are treated in the 
Compendium the way they are treated in the works discussed so far—sensory objects emit 
species through a medium, perceivers are affected by these species and perceive by means of 
their souls engaging with what is thus encountered. Yet there are also some additions and 
differences, many of them part of an interesting passage on the sensitive soul at the end of the 
Compendium. To avoid redundancy, we focus on these additions and differences here. 
Let us begin with the multiplicatio specierum. The basic description of the process matches 
that of De mente: “[B]etween the perceptible object and the senses there has to be a medium 
through which the object can multiply a form or a sign of itself”64. In the Compendium, 
however, Cusanus goes beyond merely stating this claim, providing further information. First, 
he distinguishes different levels of precision or richness species can come in: 
 
[C1] [Y]ou must take note of the fact that a perceptible sign (signum) is confused and 
generic prior to becoming proper and specific. For example, the sign of a word is, first of 
all, the sign of a sound—when the vocalization is heard by those who are far off. 
Thereafter, when it is heard at closer range, it becomes the sign of an articulated sound, 
which we call a voice. Next, when it is still closer, it becomes the sign of a voice 
belonging to a language. Finally, it becomes the sign of a specific word. The case is 
similar regarding all [perceptible signs].65 
 
While this statement could be seen as an interesting example of Nicholas trying to do justice 
to the different levels of richness experienced in sense perception, it raises questions. How is 
the loss of richness over distance to be explained? It is not plausible to posit the emission of 
different species to account this—differently rich species would have to be emitted by the 
same object to a perceiver after some sort of distance calculation on the object’s end. It is as 
implausible to attribute the loss of richness to the perceiver; the mens66 engaging with species 
would have to perceive the same species more or less richly depending on the distance it 
travelled. It would thus have to ignore some of the richness the species nonetheless contains, 
                                                 
64 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.4 n.8, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER, in Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia, 
iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita (h XI/3): “[O]portet inter 
sensibile obiectum et sensum esse medium, per quod obiectum speciem seu signum sui multiplicare possit”. 
Cusanus uses ‘species’, ‘signum’, and ‘similitudo’ synonymously in the Compendium. The species-sign 
connection is probably of Baconian origin (with Augustinian influences); on this, cf. K.H. TACHAU, Vision and 
Certitude in the Age of Ockham, 17-20.  
65 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.5 n.11, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER: “Oportet autem, ut advertas 
quomodo signum sensibile est prius confusum et genericum quam proprium et specificum. Sicut signum verbi 
est prius signum soni, dum vox a remotis auditur; deinde dum propinquius auditur, fit signum soni articulati, 
quod vox dicitur; post adhuc propinquius fit signum vocis alicuius linguae; ultimo fit signum specialis verbi; sic 
de omnibus”. 
66 Referring to what he mainly calls ‘mens’ in De mente, Cusanus uses ‘mens’, ‘intellectus’, and ‘intelligentia’ in 
the Compendium. As the latter two can also be used more narrowly to refer to specific epistemic capacities in 
contrast to other such capacities, context again plays an important role when interpreting given passages of text 
(cf. footnote 24). Cf. C. KNY, Kreative, asymptotische Assimilation, 281-286 for terminological discussions 
regarding ‘intellectus’ we cannot go into here. For coherence’s sake, we mostly use ‘mens’ in this paper. 
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and there is no reason for blurred perception when the encountered species allow for clarity. 
One possibility remains: what arrives at a perceiver has to be less rich than what is emitted by 
a sensory object depending on the distance it has to travel. How then, is this to be understood? 
The best way to make sense of this seems to be that Cusanus conceives of species as 
corporeal entities, which as the result of their traveling through a material medium lose some 
of their causal efficacy.67 Were the species to have spiritual or intentional being, then the 
distance to the perceiver would play no role whatsoever. Yet Cusanus himself does not appear 
to be interested in the specifics of what he is suggesting; the conclusion he draws from [C1] 
does not go beyond stating that there are different signs of one object.68 An interesting follow-
up to this issue of the nature of the species is that it seems to provide further insight into why 
the presence of the corporeal spirit is required to quick-start or trigger the activity of the 
perceptual power. If that power is understood as an aspect of the mind, then it would be 
difficult to explain how a corporeal species could directly lead to mental activity without any 
intermediary. Yet if there is a corporeal spiritus used as an instrument by the mens, then there 
can be a corporeal interaction between the species and this spiritus, and the mens can notice 
the change in the spiritus as she uses it as an instrument.69 In fact, that provides an 
explanation for why the mind moved the corporeal spirit towards the sense organs. Following 
Spruit,70 we should read Cusanus as suggesting that the mind is receptive of the species from 
the object only if its instrument for sensing, the corporeal spirit, is animated and directed to 
the sense organs. But this aspect just tells us about the ontological status of the species and 
nothing about their nature qua representations of external things. That comes next. 
Nicholas considers in some more detailed fashion which information is contained in these 
different signs. We find this in the passages following [C1]: 
 
[C2] [S]ince the perfection of signs admits of degrees, it will never be the case that any 
sign is so perfect and specific that it cannot be more perfect. Therefore, there is no 
givable sign of singularity, which does not admit of degrees. And so, what is singular is 
not knowable through itself (per se) but only by accident (per accidens).71 
 
[C3] [O]f this singular quality there cannot be a singular natural sign (signum) or form 
(species) because nothing singular is replicable or multiplicable, be it a substance or a 
quantity or a quality. So although there is a form and sign of quantity, there is none of this 
quantity. Therefore, quantities are individually taken note of, and known, by means of a 
sign of general quantity. In this way, [instances of] red [are known] individually by 
means of a sign of universal redness.72 
                                                 
67 Such a material understanding of species was used, for instance, by Peter John Olivi, as an objection to the 
existence of species. On this, cf. J.F. SILVA and J. TOIVANEN, “The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense 
Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter John of Olivi”.  
68 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.5 n.11, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER. 
69 The existence of a mediatory corporeal spirit is often assumed by medieval thinkers. On this cf. for example 
J.J. BONO, “Medical Spirits and the Medieval Language of Life”, in Traditio 40 (1984), 91-130. An important 
source for this discussion is Costa ben Luca; see J. WILCOX, The Transmission and Influence of Qusta Ibn 
Luqa’s ‘On the Difference between Spirit and Soul, New York 1985. Generally, positing such a spirit raises 
ontological questions regarding the relation between body and soul or mind. A corporeal spirit is an intermediary 
can be seen as an attempt of dualistic accounts to close the gap between the material and the immaterial. 
However, one can object that by positing a corporeal spirit that gap is only moved instead of closed. Instead of a 
gap between the body and the soul or mind, now a gap between the corporeal spirit and the soul or mind has to 
be accounted for. As we are not concerned with Cusanus’ take on the soul-body relation in this paper, we do not 
go into this issue and simply examine the corporeal spirit’s role in sense perception as it is described by Cusanus. 
70 Cf. L. SPRUIT, Species intelligibilis, 22. 
71 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.5 n.11, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER: “Cum […] perfectio signorum 
recipiat magis aut minus, nullum signum umquam erit ita perfectum et speciale, quin possit esse perfectius. 
Singularitatis igitur, quae non recipit magis et minus, nullum est dabile signum. Et ideo tale non est per se 
cognoscibile, sed per accidens”. 
72 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.5 n.13, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER: “[N]ec huius singularitatis 
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Two specifications regarding the information made available through the multiplicatio 
specierum can be found here. First, according to [C2], there is no species of what exactly 
something is as the singular thing or being it is. A species is a multiplication of something, 
and what is singular could not be multiplied without ceasing to be singular.73 Cusanus does 
not consider that singular sources could simply emit imperfect species of themselves. Instead, 
second, he adds another layer of complexity. As stated in [C3], he takes the accidents of a 
singular entity, as these accidents of this entity, to be singular as well. Not just of 
substances—in [C3], the terminological pair of substantia and accidens alluded to in [C2] is 
completed—there cannot be species; nothing singular can be multiplied as it is, and the 
accidents of singular entities are also singular. Yet while singular accidents cannot be 
multiplied in their singularity, there can be universal species of them, and these are what 
perception revolves around. 
The explanatory route Cusanus takes does not seem to be a route he necessarily has to take. 
It has its benefits, however. By making the accidents of an entity emit the species relevant for 
perception, the different senses can receive different species from which then a unified sign of 
the substance they are accidents of can be composed by a power able to do so. This provides a 
reason why there are different senses in the first place.74 It also depicts perception in a way 
that fits nicely into the bigger epistemological picture Cusanus works with: he can 
characterise perception as a process of asymptotic approximation in which—depending on the 
amount of species involved—something can be perceived better or worse, but never perfectly. 
If something is mistaken for something else, this is due to not enough species being employed 
to differentiate between different entities with (partly) similar accidents.75 The multiplicatio 
specierum, or at least its starting point, is therefore described in a significantly higher degree 
of complexity than in De mente: species sensibiles are universal species of singular accidents 
of singular entities. 
The second area in which the Compendium provides more material than De mente 
concerns the interaction between a perceiver and the species sensibiles. Cusanus describes this 
interaction as one between a forma formans and a forma informans. 
 
[C4] In order to see that the sensitive soul is not the intellect but is the intellect’s likeness 
(similitudo) or image, take note of the fact that in the one who sees there are two forms 
(formae)—one that informs and is a likeness of the object and another that forms and is a 
likeness of the intellect […]. In the one who sees, then, there are two likenesses—the one 
being of the object and the other being of the intellect. Without these likenesses no seeing 
occurs. The likeness of the object is superficial and extrinsic; the likeness of the intellect 
is central and intrinsic. The likeness of the object is the instrument of the likeness of the 
intellect. Therefore, the likeness of the intellect perceives or knows by way of the likeness 
of the object.76 
                                                                                                                                                        
quantitatis signum seu species naturalis potest esse singularis, cum nullum singulare sit plurificabile aut 
multiplicabile, sive sit substantia aut quantitas aut qualitas. Licet igitur quantitatis sit species et signum, non 
tamen ut huius quantitatis. Singulariter igitur quanta signo generalis quantitatis notantur et cognoscuntur. Ita 
singulariter rubea signo universalis rubedinis”. 
73 Cf. also NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.4. n.8, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER in this regard. 
74 The systematic alternative would be to say that any singular entity emits just one, imperfect, species which 
contains all the information pertaining to it. Then, through the different senses, different aspects of this species 
would be singled out and afterwards re-composed into a unified sign of the emitting entity. While this model 
would reduce complexity regarding the object emitting species and the species it emits, it would lead to 
explanatory problems when it comes to perceivers. Why, for example, should an already complete species be 
first split into different sensory pieces and then be put together again? If complete species were emitted, then 
there would be no reason for different senses, from an ontological point of view, calling into question the 
efficiency of natural beings and processes as created by god. 
75 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.5 n.15, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER for this latter point. 
76 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.11 n.35, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER: “Et ut videas animam 
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To begin with, Cusanus clearly conceives a species sensibilis as a medium quo here—the 
likenesses of external objects he is talking about in [C4] cannot be anything but species 
sensibiles, and they are described as tools to perceive what they are likenesses of. [C2] and 
[C3] show the same tendency; Cusanus does not talk about the perception of signs, but about 
the perception of something through these signs. What exactly the object of perception is can 
thus, in contrast to De mente, be answered with less ambiguity for the Compendium: we 
perceive a thing the likeness of which is made present to the senses, exciting the mind to 
activate its perceptual capacities.77 Furthermore, Cusanus points out that he does not 
understand sense perception as a one-way process, just like the passages from De coniecturis 
indicated. Forma formans and forma informans both have to fulfil specific forming roles in 
order for an act perception to come about. The latter provides information about the sensory 
object it is a likeness of, the former makes use of the information provided to perceptually get 
hold of the sensory object it is being informed about. The mind needs the sense organ and the 
likeness that represents the object,78 but there is no perception without the mind performing its 
operation. 
With that, eventually, it is time to move on to the passage on the (sensitive) soul at the end 
of the Compendium. First, in contrast to Idiota de mente, Cusanus talks about only one 
medium relevant for perception in this passage: 
 
[C5] [T]he sensitive soul must enliven the air that is associated with it in order to perceive 
[…] in air that is rarefied and transparent, the species of what is visible; in ordinary air, 
the species of sound; in dense and changed air, the species that are related to the other 
senses.79 
 
He does not elaborate on why air seems to have become the only medium. But there still 
needs to be a medium for the species to get to perceivers and Nicholas now talks about 
different types of air instead of different elements as the medium, so there is not really a 
structural change to what he describes in Idiota de mente. 
Second, Nicholas seems to undermine the notion of the mens actively engaging with 
species and thus perceiving. 
 
[C6] [A]ir serves as a body for our sensitive spirit’s life. By means of air the sensitive 
spirit enlivens the whole [human] body and perceives objects […]. Perceiving is a certain 
undergoing (sentire quoddam pati est). Therefore, the [perceptual] form acts upon the 
just-mentioned instrumental body.80 
 
Still in the context of the new emphasis Nicholas puts on air—not only as the medium 
                                                                                                                                                        
sensitivam non esse intellectum, sed eius similitudinem seu imaginem, attende quomodo in vidente duplex est 
forma, una informans, quae est similitudo obiecti, alia est formans, quae est similitudo intelligentiae […]. In 
vidente igitur duae sunt similitudines, alia obiecti, alia intelligentiae, sine quibus non fit visio. Similitudo obiecti 
est superficialis et extrinseca, similitudo intelligentiae centralis et intrinseca. Similitudo obiecti est instrumentum 
similitudinis intelligentiae. Similitudo igitur intelligentiae mediante similitudo obiecti sentit seu cognoscit”. 
77 In the Compendium as well statements can be found that could be read as Cusanus treating the species as a 
medium quod (cf. [C8] below). However, the tendency is clearly that perception is about the objects emitting 
species and not about the species themselves. 
78 Looking back at De mente, this is made very clear in NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.4 n.77, ed. R. 
STEIGER. 
79 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.13 n.39, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER: “Oportet igitur animam 
sensitivam aerem vivificare sibi coniunctum, ut [...] in aere vivo diaphano et subtili speciem visibilis, in 
communi speciem soni, in ingrossato et immutato species aliorum sensuum”. 
80 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.13 n.39, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER: “Aer igitur corpus vitae spiritus 
nostri sensitivi exsistit, quod mediante vivificat totum corpus et sentit obiecta [...]. Sentire quoddam pati est. Agit 
igitur species in corpus organicum iam dictum”. 
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through which species travel, but also as the “body” the corporeal spirit uses—, this very 
much sounds like the species not just causing an excitatio, but perceptually determining a 
perceiver.81 It has to be noted, however, that Cusanus does not claim that the species act upon 
the mens itself. Rather, they act upon the body which is vivified by the mens through the 
corporeal spirit, and this is compatible with what Cusanus describes in the passages discussed 
so far. The corporeal spirit being understood as an instrument of the mens, according to 
Cusanus, therefore does not collide with the Aristotelian definition of perception as the 
affection of an organic body. However, and this is essential to notice, the Aristotelian 
definition does not suffice to explain perception for Cusanus: 
 
[C7] But the [sensitive] soul […] does not know unless it pays attention. Therefore, it 
always has an enlivening power and a cognitive power, both of which it uses (when 
motivated) in order to pay attention. In the sensitive soul, then, there is (in addition to an 
enlivening power) a certain cognitive power […].82 
 
In this passage, Cusanus also states the cooperation of different powers of the mens once 
again; both vivifying and cognitive powers are employed in sense perception. Something else 
is more noteworthy here, though. Already in Idiota de mente ([DM1]), Cusanus talks about a 
turning of the mens when an excitatio takes place. Now, he describes this turning in terms of 
attention—only if the acting of a sensory object upon a body catches the attention of the mens, 
perception can take place. After an example of sun rays passing through coloured glass, 
Cusanus provides more information about the attention introduced in [C7]: 
 
[C8] [T]he sensitive soul, which enlivens the transparent medium, […] perceives that the 
altogether uncoloured surface of its transparent medium is imbued with a likeness. And 
turning toward the object from whence the brightness comes, it knows the object by 
means of the brightness that it senses on the surface of its own transparent body. 
Accordingly, since no seeing occurs unless the one who sees attends to the brightness, or 
intentio (for example, we do not notice passers-by if we are inattentive), it is evident that 
seeing arises from both the intentio of the colour and the attentio of the perceiver.83 
 
On the one hand, this confirms two of the points (repeatedly) made by now. The species 
emitted by sensory objects (1) interact with the perceiver on the “surface” of the medium 
vivified by the corporeal spirit—air in the sensory organs, as Nicholas spells it out in the 
Compendium; the sensory organs as reached by the corporeal spirits through blood vessels, as 
he spells it out in Idiota de mente. Perception is (2) something that can only come about if an 
object’s impact (here: intentio) and a perceiver’s perceptual activity (through attentio) are 
both given. 
On the other hand, a look back at both Idiota de mente and De coniecturis makes sense 
here: In the Compendium, Nicholas describes the mens as always active (text [9]) and makes a 
distinction between an inattentive and an attentive state of the mens (text [10]). The example 
used to point out the latter is that of passersby not being perceived without attentio. This, 
                                                 
81 Cusanus seems to bring in this notion of perceptual determination by referring to Aristotle’s definition of 
perception  in [C6] (“sentire quoddam pati est”). Cf. ARISTOTELES, De anima II c.5 (416b33). 
82 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.13 n.40, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER: “Anima autem [...] non 
cognoscit, nisi attendat. Est igitur virtutis semper vivificativae et cognitivae, qua utitur, quando movetur, ut 
attendat. Est igitur in ipsa anima sensitiva ultra virtutem vivificativam quaedam potentia cognitiva [...]”. 
83 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Compendium c.13 n.41, ed. K. BORMANN et B. DECKER: “Anima igitur sensitiva, quae 
vivificat diaphanum […], [s]entit […] enim diaphani eius superficiam penitus incoloratam in similitudine tingi, 
et se convertens ad obiectum, unde splendor vernit, medio illius splendoris, quem in superficie corporis sui 
diaphani sentit, obiectum cognoscit. Unde, cum non fiat visio, nisi videns attendat ad splendorem seu 
intentionem – praetereuntes enim, si non sumus attenti, non videmus –, patet quod visio ex intentione coloris et 
attentione videntis oritur”. 
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firstly, picks up the example of the passerby from De coniecturis ([DC2] in the previous 
section) and spells out what is only implied in the earlier text: with texts [9] and [10], 
Nicholas also makes room for cases in which the acting of a sensory object upon a perceiver 
does not lead to an excitatio at all and thus not to perception. As long as the mens is 
inattentive, there simply is no perception, despite there being affection of the sense organs, 
according to what is stated here—perception is only spoken of when there is (1) interaction 
between perceiver and perceived, which both provide necessary, but in themselves not 
sufficient conditions for acts of perception; and (2) awareness by the soul of that interaction 
(or, to be more precise, of the object initiating that interaction). Secondly, [C8] makes clear 
that a mens is not inactive until it experiences an excitatio; it is merely inattentive. In De 
mente, Cusanus does not specify whether the enlivening of the corporeal spirit is a conscious 
or a subconscious process. In the Compendium, the situation is clear: it has to be both. It is 
subconscious process as long as the mens is inattentive—therefore, it is possible to not notice 
a passerby—and becomes conscious with the mens becoming attentive—if a passerby causes 
an excitatio, then the mens consciously perceives the external thing causing the excitatio. 
In the Compendium, to summarise, while offering an account of sense perception that is 
coherent with those examined so far, Cusanus provides additional information in two main 
areas: he fleshes out the multiplicatio specierum that is simply taken for granted in De mente 
and he states that there are two levels of attention involved in perception, shedding light on 
how the mens enlivens the corporeal spiritus. Furthermore, Cusanus is quite clear regarding 
the (primary) object of perception in the Compendium—a species sensibilis is described as a 
medium, quo. Given the coherence of the accounts of sense perception in the Compendium 
and De mente, it is valid to use this as confirmation that the same is the case in De mente. 
Finally, there is a difference between the Compendium and De mente when it comes to the 
medium through which the species sensibiles are transmitted. In the former, Cusanus talks 
only about air as this medium, in the latter he makes use of all elements. As he describes 
different types of air in the Compendium with properties matching those of the elements as 
described in De mente, however, this has no impact on the systematic coherence of the 
accounts of perception in the two works. 
 
 
II. Cusanus on Rational Perception  
 
Having thus concluded our examination of key texts concerning sense perception in Cusanus’ 
works, we can proceed to the systematic evaluation of our results. 
We begin by briefly describing the model of perception presented in these texts. According 
to Cusanus, two necessary conditions must be met in order for sense perception to come 
about. First, an object of perception has to make itself present to a perceiver in such a way as 
to make the triggering of a perceptual episode possible. Cusanus calls this an ‘excitatio’ and 
describes it in a perspectivist framework as species sensibiles bodily affecting a perceiver 
when they arrive in sense organs. By impeding the motion of the corporeal spiritus used by 
the perceiver’s mens to enliven the body, the species catch the perceiver’s attention. Second, 
once attentive, a perceiver engages with a sensory object by means of the species responsible 
for the excitatio. This engagement is not described as the perceiver being cognitively 
determined by the species affecting her. Rather, according to Cusanus, it is the perceiver’s 
mens that assimilates itself to a sensory object by means of the species this object emits and 
by using the bodily spiritus as an instrument of its action. Cusanus thus describes perception 
as a process in which perceivers and objects of perception join forces, one providing the what 
of perception (the external things) and the other the how of perception (the attentional state). 
If either of the two requirements is not met—because no species affect a perceiver or because 
a perceiver fails to engage with a sensory object through the species it emits—, there simply is 
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no perception.84 
To account for the content of perceptual experience, however, it is not sufficient that a 
perceiver is merely put into a certain attentional state by a combination of the action of 
external objects and the perceiver’s own initiative. This would imply that what is taken in 
through the senses yields the information it contains in a way that no “decoding” is 
necessary—once the information is there and the perceiver is aware of it, the perceiver would 
not have to do anything in order to access the information. Cusanus clearly opposes such a 
notion of sensory intake. According to him, the information species sensibiles are carrying has 
to be ordered or structured to become perceptual content. While Cusanus is not terribly clear 
as to what that ‘structured information’ is, it is at least clear that this information is the result 
of the joint action of the perceiver’s sensory and cognitive powers, which we qualify as 
cooperation directed by the higher power of reason. This ‘directed cooperation’ is an 
expression of the activity of the mind in perception that characterises Cusanus’ philosophy. 
This leads us to the main question we want to discuss in this section: what exactly does it 
mean that perception is rational, according to Cusanus? Does the rational activity relevant for 
perception take place after indeterminate sensing, concurrently with indeterminate sensing or 
does it transform indeterminate sensing? From the textual evidence collected in the first two 
sections, we can confidently deny that the rational activity relevant for perception takes place 
after indeterminate sensing.85 That leaves two possibilities: (a) rational activity is concurrent 
with indeterminate sensing or (b) rational activity transforms indeterminate sensing.  
The language in De coniecturis and parts of De mente could be seen as suggesting (b), that 
is to say if the ratio is in the senses and if that means bringing discrimination into 
indeterminate sensing, then it seems like the ratio transforms the senses when it is in them. 
What speaks against such a reading is that Cusanus maintains the distinction between the 
specifics of sensing (indeterminacy) and rationalising (order, conceptualisation, 
discrimination). He does not claim that due to the ratio joining the senses, the senses acquire 
the ability to discriminate, for example. Thes senses still provide indeterminate content, and 
the ratio remains the discriminating power; they just work together. Cusanus does not talk 
about the ratio transforming the senses, he talks about the mens doing in different epistemic 
“environments” what is possible within these environments. If sense perception is to yield 
more than indeterminate content, Cusanus holds, then the rational activity of discrimination 
and ordering has to “join” it. This makes (a) the more plausible interpretation.  
The follow-up question then is: how is this concurrence to be understood? To answer this 
question, one has to look at how Cusanus describes the mental processes taking place after an 
excitatio has occurred—we can skip the processes leading up to the excitatio here, as the mens 
becomes perceptually active only when woken up to (conscious) attention through an 
excitatio.86 In De mente, Cusanus states that what characterises the mind is its capacity of 
being a conforming and configuring power.87 Conformation, in the case of sense perception, 
consists in the exercise of two particular powers of the mind. By means of its sensory 
power(s), the information carried by species is grasped indiscriminately; to this end, the mens 
makes uses different arterial spirits as instruments for different senses. By means of its 
rational power, the mens discriminates and orders what the senses grasp indiscriminately. 
Employing both sensory and rational powers, the mind reacts to an excitatio by assimilating 
                                                 
84 Our examination in the first section of this paper shows that the core assumptions of this model are stable from 
De coniecturis, one of Cusanus’ first works, to the Compendium, one of his last works. Which components of 
this model are emphasised differs between the works due to the differences in what these works are focused on. 
As they remain components of one model, however, the works complement each other—despite the fact that, at 
first sight, the shifts in terminology characteristic of Cusanus might seem to suggest the opposite. 
85 Cf. p. 7-10, 13sq., and 19 above. 
86 Regarding the excitatio, cf. p. 7sq. above. For the passages on the mind be woken up in De coniecturis and De 
mente, cf. footnotes 8, 43. 
87 Cf. footnote 26. 
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itself to the external thing presented, judging what it finds itself confronted with.88 The result 
of perceptual assimilation is the production of conceptual(ised) content by bringing the coarse 
information provided by the senses under the ordering effect of the ratio. In De coniecturis, 
this ordering effect is described in terms of unity—the multiplicity or alterity of what is 
sensible is “lifted” into the more unified state of the ratio—, and this thought is still present in 
De mente.89  
Concurrence therefore does certainly not mean that rational discrimination and 
indeterminate sensing run along independently next to each other—they are much more 
closely and intricately connected. While the senses are not transformed into something else by 
the ratio, rationality is an integral part of perception. There are different aspects to the order 
and unification it contributes to perception. First, they consist in the activity of a power of 
discrimination, which discriminates between the likeness (“an intervening thing”) of the 
external thing in the eye and the external thing itself.90 According to Cusanus, this power of 
discrimination brings with it also the capacity for inference, of a low kind, and as such is 
found in “highly developed non-rational animals”91. This reference is clearly to a discussion 
that is found in Roger Bacon, among others, in the thirteenth century, and which explains why 
these kinds of animals are capable of, like Nicholas remarks, recognising their owners. As a 
result, there is a sense in which they could be said to have reason, but only in an equivocal 
way. 
But Cusanus also adds, second, that such a power of discrimination found in non-rational 
animals is of a different kind than that found in human beings. In the former, it is not 
associated with the intellect, and thus lacks focus and accuity. In the case of the latter, human 
beings, the power of discrimination is exercised in an intellectually informed way; this means 
that it not only infers but knows what it infers. We take this to mean that non-rational animals 
are able to see their owner qua it being familiar to them, whereas human beings are able to 
know that they perceive (they are able to discriminate between instances of perceiving)92 and 
what the thing they perceive is. The difference between human and non-human animals, 
according to the passage in question, is a distinction between intellectually informed 
rationality and uninformed reasoning. 
To return to the original question, we can say that for Cusanus, in human beings, the 
operation of the mind in perception is constituted by the assimilation to external things upon 
being aroused by their presence and the result is at the first level the production of forms of 
things,93 and at a second level, but concurrent with the first, discrimination, that is judgement 
combined with inferential reasoning.94 Not only are we aware that we perceive but also what 
we perceive—the content (the what) of that perceptual experience having a conceptual nature, 
as has been made clear before. It has to be kept in mind, in line with Cusanus’ theory of 
cognition, that these concepts are ‘conjectural’ and thus subject to uncertainty as the true 
nature of things not created by the human mens is inaccessible to the human mens. This is the 
inherent nature of human perception, and of human knowledge in general.95  
There is a final issue we must turn to, concerning the way in which perception is to be 
undertood as active or passive. Our presentation of Cusanus’ view, especially in this last 
section, has emphasised the active role of reason to shape any perceptual experience, but we 
cannot forget the role of objects that via their species excite the soul to perception. How to 
understand these potentially conflicting claims? One way is to focus on what Cusanus says 
                                                 
88 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.4 n.77sq. , ed. R. STEIGER. 
89 Cf. for example NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.4. n.75, ed. R. STEIGER. 
90 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.82, ed. R. STEIGER. 
91 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.82, ed. R. STEIGER. 
92 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.5 n.84, ed. R. STEIGER. 
93 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.7 n.99, ed. R. STEIGER. 
94 Cf. NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.7 n.100, ed. R. STEIGER. 
95 Cf. footnote 13. 
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about the nature of assimilation and the conditions for it taking place. We have seen above 
how he emphasises the initiating role of the mind moving the corporeal spirit, which makes 
the reception of the species in the sense organ have a cognitive import. At the same time, he 
emphasises that at the level of the mind it is also its assimilative nature that makes the object 
cognitively significant. What we make of what he means with this is well illustrated by 
Cusanus’ take on the Aristotelian seal-wax analogy: 
 
Hence, that subtle arterial spirit, which is enlivened by mind, is fashioned by mind into a 
likeness of the [perceptual] form, which has presented [itself as] an obstacle to [this] spirit’s 
motion. Analogously: by a man who has both the use of his mind and the skill, a pliable slab 
of wax is molded into the shape of the object that actually has presented itself to [this] artisan. 
Without mind no configuration can be made [...]. Rather, it is mind that marks the boundaries 
of all things.  
Therefore, suppose that a slab of wax were conceived of as being informed with a mind. In 
that case, the mind existing within the wax would configure the wax to every shape presented 
to that mind.96 (emphasis added)  
               
What is most important to our purposes in this passage appears in the second paragraph 
(starting with ‘Therefore’).97 It shows—unequivocally, in our understanding—that Cusanus 
takes the assimilative power of the mind, qua principle of life of the body, to be the 
explanation of how we are able to perceive and why we perceive the way we do. Perception 
depends on objects presenting themselves by means of species as representative 
intermediaries carrying information. The mind does not create perceptual content ex nihilo, it 
assimilates itself to what is presented to it. Yet perceptual assimilation is, as Cusanus’ take on 
the wax metaphor clearly shows, a activity of the mind in which its rational and sensory 
powers are employed concurrently. Such an assimilation cannot be but conceptual for human 
beings. 
   
 
III. Conclusion  
 
In this article, we presented the first interpretation of Nicholas of Cusa’s theory of perception 
based on a thorough analysis of key texts. Our interpretation yields two main claims: first, 
even if this may not always be clear on the textual surface, Cusanus’ account of perception is 
well-grounded in the philosophical tradition on the issue, be it the Augustinian take on the 
mind or the perspectivist doctrine of the species. Second, according to his conception of 
perceptual experience, it is permeated by reason; reason discriminates and structures the 
incoming sensory content that is made available to the perceiver by means of sensible species. 
  
In Cusanus, the activity of the mind—enlivening the corporeal spirit and bringing its 
structuring-ready rational capacity to bear on the sensory content—should be understood in 
the light of Augustinian sources. This is particularly clear in the case of the excitatio that 
triggers the mind to perceptual action and the metaphor of the mind-informed-wax that he 
presents to illustrate that assimilation consists in the mind structuring the sensory information 
                                                 
96 NICOLAUS CUSANUS, Idiota de mente c.7 n.100sq., ed. R. STEIGER: “Unde spiritus ille substilis arteriarum, qui 
est mente animatus, per mentem ad similitudinem speciei, quae obstaculum praestitit motui, spiritui sic 
conformatur sicut cera flexibilis per hominem mentis usum ac artem habentem configuratur rei praesentialiter 
artifici praesentatae. Nam omnes configurationes [...] absque mente fieri nequeunt; sed mens est, quae omnia 
terminat. Unde si conciperetur cera mente informata, tunc mens intus exsistens configuraret ceram omni figurae 
sibi praesentatae”. 
97 On the living wax metaphor and its clear Augustinian origin, as found in Robert Kilwardby, John Pecham, 
Peter John Olivi, and Roger Marston, see J.F. SILVA, “The Chameleonic Mind”. 
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at the occasion of the presence of the external thing to the senses. The second case where the 
influence of a preceding theory is felt is on the function of discrimination assigned to the 
ratio. The notion of discrimination as described by Cusanus is strikingly similar to the one 
found in authors belonging to the perspectivist tradition, even if within that tradition we find 
disagreements concerning the rational or non-rational nature of that power. Further research 
will certainly allow for a clarification of the extent of these influences, but for our purposes in 
this article it suffices to show how Nicholas managed to combine with great acuity elements 
that bespeak for the active nature of the mind in perception. By doing this he plays an 
important and significant role in the development of theories of perception.  
Perhaps more astonishing, however, is the way he puts these theories to use. Even if 
the explanatory framework of his account of perception is different from ours, Cusanus 
manages to capture and explain a tension in perceiving (and cognition in general, for that 
matter) that features prominently in how we experience it in our daily lives: on the one hand, 
we simply perceive things with the self-assurance of perception generally getting things 
“right”. Theories of perception (try to) spell out how this works. On the other hand, there are 
countless situations in which this self-assurance is undermined—we are not sure what we just 
heard or saw or touched; we mistake something for something else; when perceptually 
engaging with something more closely, we start noticing aspects we were not aware of before. 
We do not lose our trust in our perceptual capacities, but we may well ask ourselves whether 
we can ever fully grasp anything. Framing perception (and cognition in general) as asymptotic 
assimilation, Cusanus provides a theory about perceptual experience and the world it is the 
experience of, rather than just a theory about the faculty-psychology model of the soul 
explaining that experience in a certain detachment from the world we experience. 
